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When I first read the Practice of Everyday Life, I had just left my discipline 
(neuroscience) as well as my country and was struggling to find my way 
in intellectually and socially unfamiliar terrain. I was encouraged thus to 
find a book, which legitimated the ways by which a stranger might 
appropriate and transform the materials of another culture. Several years 
later I read it a second time from the position of a researcher-consultant 
and found its insights still relevant: this time it was his outline of the 
stance of the intellectual towards the object of study that deeply moved 
me - first in its insistence on one’s obligation towards the implicit, 
informal, non-verbal subject matter; and second in its acknowledgement 
of the power axis inherent in every research project, which is all too often 
ignored or suppressed in the literature on methodology in the social 
sciences. 
 Now, returning to the book for the third time, what was striking 
and sometimes bewildering in earlier days seems eminently familiar; yet 
the book retains its freshness and relevance. This time my project is to 
take in the whole book rather than to just poach on the text for my own 
purposes (a term Certeau uses and a practice he actually endorses) with a 
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concern for the conditions of its genesis. I am folding later chapters into 
the treatment of earlier ones as illustrations or further developments in 
order to do justice to the rich ness and complex overtones of Certeau’s 
thought, while keeping this review within a tolerable length. 
 
About the author and his milieu 
Michel(-Jean-Emmanuel de la Barge) de Certeau was born in 1925 in 
Chambery, in the southeast of France. He studied the classics and 
philosophy in Grenoble and Lyon, then went to Paris to study History of 
Religion in Early Modern Europe at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes 
(EPHE). This school boasts among its former students such eminent 
personalities as Claude Levi- Strauss, Marcel Mauss, Alexandre Koyre, 
Alexandre Kojeve, Cornelius Castoriadis and many more. (Certeau’s 
affinity with practices and methods of anthropology go back to the 
orientation of the school. Bourdieu, for instance, did a seminar on his 
work on Kabylian society at the school in the sixties.) At EPHE Certeau 
discovered the works of Pierre Favre, one of the founders of the Jesuit 
order, and through him his religious calling: he joined the Jesuit order and 
was ordained. 
 Throughout his life he comfortably balanced his stance as priest, 
as academic and as public intellectual traversing the boundaries of 
theology, history, anthropology, sociology, and psychology. He founded a 
journal and wrote on the student and worker protests in ’68. Together 
with Lacan he founded the Ecole Freudienne de Paris, an informal group 
dedicated to discuss the works of Freud. He was part of the critical 
movement in history — Braudel of the Annales School was also an 
instructor at the Ecole Pratique, participated in a department in 
Ethnology in Paris and taught at the universities of Paris VIII (Vincennes) 
and Paris VII, the university of Geneva and UC San Diego. This last 
academic appointment may explain the reception of his work in the US 
and can also account for the American influences on it, notably from 
Goffman, Garfinckel and Illich
1
. 
 Other French intellectuals whose works are contemporaneous 
with his own are Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition, Derrida’s Of 
Grammatology (1997), and Bourdieu’s An Outline of a Theory of Practice 
(1977) and The Logic of Practice (1980), to name a relevant and 
prominent few. Foucault’s work on the link between knowledge and 
institutional power was published earlier and formed a cornerstone in 
Certeau’s thinking. Structuralism was the dominant position in all the 
debates of the time. Together these influences made for a rich intellectual 
climate in which he struggled to express his own views. 
 
1 I am grateful to J.-P. Dupuy for telling me about the friendship between 
Certeau and  Illich in San Diego. 
Journal of Business Anthropology, 10(1), Spring 2021 
 
 204 
 Despite the 70s’ practice of critically interrogating every 
theoretical position for its ideological underpinnings and despite a 
lifetime spent in criss-crossing disciplinary and institutional boundaries, 
Certeau’s writings appear very much of a piece, consistently exploring 
and extending a number of themes that occupied him throughout his life. 
These were his concern with historiography and writing as a mode of 
production, his critical stance with respect to the universality of 
knowledge and the truth claimed for scientific representations and their 
political use in society. As a consequence of this he saw the intellectual, 
including himself, as non-neutral part of society, necessarily carrying a 
political role and responsibility. And last, but not least, was his concern 
with cultural practice as an object resistant to representation and his 
investigation of the ways by which it is made into, or fails to be made into, 
knowledge, which is the main concern of the book here reviewed. 
 None of the aforementioned ideas are news today. One might even 
say, they are considered self-evident and taken for granted in some 
academic circles. But in the seventies questioning institutional rationality 
and exposing its exercise of and collusion with power was still a 
courageous act. And even if we today claim to “know” theoretically this to 
be the case, we have not overcome that state of affairs any more for being 
aware of it. 
 Certeau himself did not believe that a society could do without 
governmentality. He saw the need for a dominant rationality as an 
endoskeleton that makes society cohere — even if by fantasy (Lacan 
2004), but he nevertheless thought of the members of society as 
essentially able to escape from complete submission to this rationality, in 
contradistinction to Bourdieu and Foucault. If rationality outlined options 
and paths that any member of society was expected to follow, Certeau 
posited the possibility for everyone to creatively explore the interstitial 
spaces and to design new paths. In this way Everyman (an expression 
representing all humankind) is able to both question and affirm 
membership in society, and society might benefit even against its overt 
goals from such liminal or covert creation. 
 Certeau dedicates the book to the common man. One may ask 
what this gesture means. It is unlikely that anyone outside the educated 
elite will be able or want to follow the argument it presents. Moreover, 
the book is not really dealing with the common man in the sense that it 
establishes a psychology of what is common to every man, woman or 
child. Rather it reaches beyond individual experience and action towards 
the (transcendental) ground of everyday practice and includes a defense 
of “ordinary” language. More likely the gesture is directed at his fellow-
academics and constitutes an invocation of the common man as the 
absent arbiter of the veracity and relevance of the text. This is a sort of 
endorsement of the ethnological discourse and methods, despite 
Certeau’s general criticism of such discourse and writing. 
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Making the Practice of Everyday Life 
In 1974 a government institution commissioned Certeau to carry out an 
investigation into France’s popular culture with the goal to inform 
political and financial decision-making. The two volume study of L’ 
Invention du Quotidien. Arts de Faire (vol 1) and Habiter, Cuisiner (vol 
2), the latter written by Pierre Mayol and Luce Giard, was the result of 
this commission. It was published in 1980 in France and in 1984 in 
English under the title “The Practice of Everyday Life.” Certeau worked 
with the translator on the first part, which contains his theoretical and 
epistemological considerations a propos such a study. After his death 
Luce Giard, his collaborator, guided the subsequent translation and 
publication of Certeau’s works in the US. 
 The study departed radically from what a state institution would 
have expected and it frustrated all attempts to inform political decisions. 
Instead of studying the demographics, which could claim to be 
representative of French society, Certeau and his collaborators, in a 
gesture that comes close to defiance, describe a family in a specific 
neighborhood in the context of their everyday life. The choice of method 
and subject is highly significant. Consonant with his writings in Culture as 
Plural, Certeau refuses to entertain the normal understanding of popular 
culture as relating to special groups, whose activities are outside the 
norm of mainstream society. Instead, he approaches culture as the daily 
activities and habitual procedures of normal, but not average, humans. 
 Culture, Certeau says, consists in what someone does for him- or 
herself, and not for the boss. (CP p. 275.) This claims, first, that culture is 
active and posits the act by which each individual marks what others 
furnish. And, second, by reference to the “boss” it relates culture to 
present-day economic and historic conditions. Culture at present, he 
claims consonant with Foucault, is the space left over from a long process 
of knowledge-making which brings human practices under greater 
economic, scientific and technological control. What has been left over 
after 250 years of Enlightenment are merely those activities that “had no 
legitimacy with respect to productivist rationality” (PEL p. 69)– i.e., 
everyday activities such as cleaning, cooking, sewing. 
 If culture does not enter into the accepted representations or 
academic disciplines, it is constituted as the other of society’s control: the 
realm of the evanescent, unstructured and playful, if not useless. This 
state of affairs is itself in need of analysis and motivates Certeau’s oblique 
approach: one cannot  treat practice as just another object of study; it 
calls for reflection on the methodology of the knowledge-making 
disciplines as well. His calling the study the “Invention of the Everyday” 
(L’Invention du Quotidien), a phrase that leaves unspecified whether one 
witnesses the invention of practices by the common man or the invention 
of the concept of the everyday by the researcher, teeters between these 
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two kinds of making. For Certeau, both readings are possible and can hold 
at the same time: the first, because of the way he conceives of culture as 
play, poiesis, and invention; the second because of his reflection on the 
work of the historiographer or scientist as a producer of a reality made 
permanent through writing. The tension persists throughout the book in 
his reaching towards a genuine expression of the phenomenon of practice 
as well as his reflections on the limits of theory. 
 
Writing of history/ history as writing. 
The second reading goes back to Certeau’s work as historiographer. 
Alongside the New Historians of the Annales school Certeau critically 
examined history’s claims to truth. The New Historians pointed out the 
naïve realism of earlier approaches, which treated history as a series 
of objective happenings that could be represented without bias, and 
emphasized instead that history was made (through a writing 
practice, by a profession) and thus is essentially in- distinguishable 
from fiction. 
 Certeau tries to reconcile the two positions on history, old and 
new (Courtois-l’Heureux 2009, p.118), through his conception of the 
event: it grows from existing conditions and yet can occasion an 
intervention that redi- rects future developments. He is not the first or 
the only one who uses the concept of an event (Blanchot 1980, 
Lyotard 1988). This ‘eventful’ conception  of history is at the root of 
the opening that enables the common man to intervene in the fabric 
of pre-existing structures and to transform a prescribed rationality 
into a personal, individual expression of culture. 
 Certeau’s work in historiography investigates the practice of 
writing as the means of producing a reality and establishing itself as its 
authoritative ground, a practice that underlies all academic 
disciplines. The gesture of writing creates a complete break with the 
past, as if the blank page constituted a tabula rasa of actual fact. One 
discerns, says Roland Barthes, “the movement of negation and the 
impotence of accomplishing it, all at the same time, through which 
literature invents itself as if starting from a place without signs, with a 
dream of Orphean quality – as a writer without literature.” (Barthes 
1953, p. 9). In this manner writing replaces what was before it and 
produces a new beginning as a voluntary rupture with history. 
Certeau uses Freud’s book on Moses to illustrate how Moses, the 
Egyptian, has been forgotten and erased by the fictional character of 
Moses, the founder of the new Jewish tradition. 
 Writing produces then first and foremost the empty page as 
a proper place free of the ambiguity of the world, cleared for the 
operation of a subject. Only after that does it produce a text put 
together from materials and fragments and ordered based on rules 
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and procedures. The traces on the page are the trajectory of these 
operations as they chain together and lay down a path – a world not 
received, but made by the subject with the help of representations. In 
the process orality and folklore come to be seen as things that must be 
left behind because they resist progress or at least do not contribute 
to it. They are suppressed, and finally displaced by writing. 
 But, Certeau counters, writing is itself subject to the actions of 
time and history. It draws on and continues the representations 
whereby a society presents itself to itself. In that it is repetition – a 
repetition generated from struc- ture, as the New Historians claim, 
and left to itself a potentially endless recrea- tion of the same. The 
researcher, the scientist and the intellectual as members of the elite 
participate in this writing in the service of a continuation and 
reproduction of society. This state of affairs, too, Certeau conceives as 
the outcome of a historical development: “The mastery of language 
guarantees and isolates a new power, a bourgeois power, that of 
making history and of fabricating languages” (p. 139), challenging the 
aristocratic order, and establishing a new order in which socio-
economic position and advancement depends on the mastery of that 
language. Finally the educational system creates and recreates the 
dominant class, i.e. those that make language the instrument of their 
production. (All that is very much in Foucault’s vein.) 
 Certeau juxtaposes the writing, which creates mere repetition, to 
reading as an active performative, even subversive poiesis. This is an 
inversion which he performs several times in the book: it mirrors his 
rejection of the common man conceived as duped and passive consumer 
and his treatment of everyday practices as an active construction of 
culture set against the supposedly mindless reception of mass-produced 
goods. In this his analysis is reminiscent of early Baudrillard, who was 
also a contemporary. 
 In criticizing the dominant representations besides making a 
political point shared by Marxist colleagues he also makes a philosophical 
point about the nature of representation. Like Derrida, Blanchot and 
other theorists of writing, Certeau points to the peculiar status of 
representation as the place of an absence. It is in its reference to the 
absent other that the representation finds its ground and its legitimacy. 
The relation is necessarily an ethical one, indicating an obligation not just 
towards the Other as another human being, but also towards the other — 
lower-case — as subject matter of a discipline. The representation can 
maintain an openness or filter out alterity in the (illusory) production of a 
totalizing knowledge — one of the dangers and triumphs of the 
structuralist approach. Making knowledge and ordering material under 
the auspices of the institutions and disciplines of a society is thus a far 
from harmless and value-neutral enterprise. 




Certeau shares with Foucault, Bourdieu, and Lyotard the stance that 
society is essentially violent in its imposition of categories and 
procedures on its members. Like Foucault who describes the medical and 
educational practices of modernity as ways by which institutions render 
visible, control and shape behaviors, Certeau sees society as a space 
where power is wielded and rationality is imposed. The type of rationality 
itself may change over time, but it is a singular one and must be, in order 
to present the image of a unified society to its members. 
 Certeau defends culture against this homogenization. In Culture as 
Plural (CP 1980) he emphasizes the relativity of perspectives and the 
legitimacy of alternative forms of life in society. This explains his 
resistance to the instituted categories of French demographics, when he 
engages in a study of popular culture. In that sense all knowledge-making 
practices are suspect because in making something visible they draw on 
pre-existing categories and in the process reinforce them. They serve the 
institutions of society rather than any specific group, but in general they 
are more influenced by the elite, which tries to reproduce society in its 
own image. 
 On the other hand, these panoptic procedures by becoming 
universal and built into socio-technical apparatuses (Foucault’s 
“dispositifs”) escape the control of the system itself. They cannot be 
turned around at a moment’s notice even by the powers-that-are, because 
they have become embedded in the physical environment and linked by 
habit to the mental makeup of their human counterparts: dispositif and 
disposition together deliver the desired product of regulated behavior. 
Certeau senses here already an opening for the tactical practices of the 
common man. 
 Foucault and Bourdieu are both convinced that free will is an 
illusion: Foucault, because the instituted apparatus constrains the 
available pathways; Bourdieu, because for him society instills in its 
members the motivation and values consistent with its reproduction. In 
both cases societal mechanisms of control operate underneath the radar 
of individual choice and political awareness. A member of society can feel 
perfectly free in choosing these procedures. Certeau agrees, but denies 
that the control is a total one. 
 Certeau advances the argument for the ability of the common man 
to escape from total control by showing that there is play (Spielraum) in 
the prescriptions of society. The procedures that the system has elected 
to reinforce, are only one set of possible procedures, he states. Others are 
equally feasible and can be composed with the means that society has set 
aside for its own. “A society is thus composed of certain foregrounded 
practices organizing its normative institutions and of innumerable other 
practices that remain minor, always there, but not organizing discourse 
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and preserving the beginning or remains of different (institutional, 
scientific) hypotheses for this society or for others.” (PEL p. 48) 
 Since the foregrounded apparatus is nevertheless not the only 
(possible) one, there is a repertoire of non-dominant partial apparatuses, 
logics and procedures available to users, that offer “a polytheism of 
scattered practices” (PEL p.48). The institutions are thus stealthily 
colonized, the system of discipline and control is today itself “vampirized” 
by other procedures. One can view this as a way for newness and 
innovation to emerge through a recombination of existing parts, a case of 
composting in the societal realm (Wild 2012). 
 Certeau also turns the Foucauldian logic of visibility around: the 
panoptic strategies of society see only what they are prepared to see; they 
are blind when faced with a practice that appropriates their positions and 
means and uses them for different ends. If someone makes up a new path, 
the divergence will not be noted because the system is restricted to 
reading all behavior in terms of the dominant procedures. Thus panoptic 
procedures produce their own mirage of complete knowledge from 
partial areas of visibility resulting in the blind spot of a system to its 
outside. Society then uses the authority of intellectuals to legitimate this 
unified representation and to confer power on this knowledge. 
 Certeau’s argument against Bourdieu is slightly different, but 
makes a similar point: a system that sees all practices motivated by the 
accumulation of all kinds of capital to serve the reproduction of society, 
cannot conceive of a rebellion in its own space. Its own intellectual 
achievement of closure prevents it. 
 The role of the intellectual in the production of knowledge and 
representations for and in society must therefore be subjected to critical 
analysis. Certeau refuses the researcher a position outside, above or 
neutral to society. Instead he sees intellectuals — himself included —
function in the service of society: through their making of representations 
and knowledge they create possible pathways for the members of society 
to explore. As such their work relates to the production of culture as well 
as to the maintenance of power. Society makes the expert its 
spokesperson by granting him authority beyond his area of expertise. 
This is how the system extends and confirms the power of scientific 
representations beyond their natural sphere of applicability. Zygmunt 
Baumann makes a similar point in his Legislators and Interpreters 
(Baumann 1989). 
 But the intellectual is really in no better position to view the 
whole than any other one cultural agent. Scientific representations are 
construed from within the politics of place and strategies of engagement 
like other practices. “Theory,” Certeau says, “is a way of participating in 
events” (PEL p. 79). 
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What happened to the authentic voice? 
Certeau discusses the role speech is made to play in a society dominated 
by writing, where true orality has been long silenced (WH p.346). In the 
beginning, he claims, was not the word, but the “voice of the master:” the 
bible was not experienced as writing; it was heard. Little by little the 
voice recedes, the “spoken word” loses its authority through a corruption 
of the text, ironically, because copying brings in mistakes and additions. 
But as writing appears to take over, orality remains its backer, so to 
speak, and speech retains its traditional connection to an incorruptible 
authenticity. As a practice of the loss of speech, writing’s meaning still 
claims to lie outside itself, in a place beyond, towards which it moves, but 
which its very movement keeps reproducing at a remove. 
 This situation is a productive kind of limbo, from which systems of 
authority can extract a large array of possible meanings, but the source of 
which is usually kept under wraps. When societal representations of 
knowledge present themselves in the modality of speech, this indicates an 
important shift, because then it claims to be speaking in the name of 
reality. Voice and Speech are supposed to be spontaneous expressions 
and they thereby project authenticity: the eyewitness account is more 
believable than the remarks of the official commentator or the newspaper 
article after the fact. Any government is well aware of the effect conveyed 
by spontaneous speech and has developed its own strategies to control 
access and expression. Certeau’s article The Capture of Speech on the ’68 
protests in France describes precisely a moment in time when students 
and workers managed for a short period of time to take over this 
authority from the government. Writing can dissimulate voice and 
convincingly present a picture of reality, precisely because reality is 
always some part fictional. Official writing can produce a complete and 
convincing picture of events through a concatenation of dispersed 
reports, maps and data, overriding the isolated “anecdotes” of the 
eyewitnesses (Smith 1987, p.160). 
 
Everyday practices. The ruses and tricks of the common man. 
It is time to return to the practices of the common man, who is after all 
the hero of Certeau’s book. When the common man makes culture – 
always in a manner that is personal and local, not conscious of being 
“culture” and called upon by an urgent situation – he must do so in-
between and sometimes despite the institutional effort. He is called to act, 
but he is weak in two respects. He does not have the power to impose his 
will on the system. And the moment in time when action can be successful 
is not chosen by him, but determined by the situation. 
 This lack of power determines his choice of method. He improvises 
with what is ready-to-hand in the system; only it must be fitted to the 
occasion, so it cannot be used in the expected way or for a pre-existing 
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goal. He must turn the material into something else, something new. This 
is the ruse he performs. It becomes necessary, because the system has no 
ready-made answer or because its process is too slow to produce one in 
time; yet the system also does not allow for invention and so the creation 
is carried out underneath the radar, so to speak (PEL p.85). What is 
described as a workaround in an organization is often of that kind – a 
response that is not sanctioned, but occasionally tolerated because it 
successfully settles a case; tolerated, yes, but never acknowledged by the 
system. 
 The ruse is then a just-in-time assemblage, which does not outlast 
its application. Having done its work, it dissolves into thin air, since it has 
no place in the system or a representation to sustain it. From the 
standpoint of the system, ruses resist the effort to bring everything under 
one regime of rationality. In that sense cultural practices undermine and 
evade the force of the system. Yet it is “a silent and common, almost 
sheeplike subversion,” says Certeau (PEL p. 200), which does not leave 
the system or threaten it. These practices have nothing in common with 
liminal pockets of society or attacks from the margins. They are the 
constant “murmuring of the everyday” (PEL p. 200). 
 
Murmur of the everyday – reading, walking, speaking 
Reading takes on a new status in Certeau’s description. It is a 
performance that shares characteristic features with the ruse: it is an 
invisible production, using materials not of one’s own making, freely 
gathering and selecting (hence his term poaching) from what is 
presented. Reading is transformative because it moves in an affective 
circuit freely combining images, words and sound and memories; it is a 
process, which leaves neither the target domain nor the start domain 
unchanged. Certeau compares readers to the walkers of the city: they do 
not create, but traverse space and leave no trace of their passing. This 
makes implicit reference to the distinction between tactic and strategy, 
where strategy is always associated with a proper space, a territory. 
Writing accumulates; reading “takes no measure against the erosion of 
time,” (PEL p. 174), it is a bricolage made from the pieces at hand, without 
a goal or project, a game played out with and against the text, which 
advances and retreats, “alternatively captivating, […], playful, protesting, 
fugitive” (PEL p. 175). 
 Walking is to the urban system what the speech act is to language 
(PEL p. 97) or the act of writing to the written text: it is a illocutionary 
activity, where turns of path resemble turns of phrases, a composition in 
both symbolic and environmental registers using rhetorical moves like 
synecdoche (a part stands for the whole) and asyndeton (leaving out 
parts) and physical moves of skipping, pulling in and doubling back. One 
can identify a tendency to concentrate — to attach heightened intensity to 
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a place, and another to separate — to string out islands of intensity across 
some empty distance. Instead of the planar simultaneous organization of 
the panoptic (concept) city, in which the metric of space remains always 
the same, walking happens in a heterogeneous world of sensuous 
impressions, enacted stories and memories. To walk is to lack a place, he 
says, and the city is the social experience of lacking a place, and so the 
experience of time as unfolding takes over. To enact space is “to be other 
and to move towards the other” (PEL p. 110) and this is the opening to 
and the pre-condition for the potential intimacy of an encounter with 
strangers. 
 Language inserts itself into these spatial wandering as a tool that 
affects reality: signs, proper names and well-known stories orient the 
unplanned wanderings, turn a place into familiar and inhabitable site and 
create a defense against the exposure to spaces “brutally lit by an alien 
reason” (PEL p.104). Places are themselves inward-turning histories full 
of accumulated time. By walking and stringing them together one 
composes a unique affective trajectory. (Remember in this context the 
practice of “derive,” an unplanned journey through the urban landscape, 
which was cultivated by the Situationists (Debord 1956). 
 Storytelling looks then very similar to walking, except that it 
performs in language: one starts with a pre-existing tale, but plot and 
characters are adjusted and shift their relative positions in response to 
the situation and the audience. New elements or details are added in, 
some parts expand while others contract or disappear. The telling 
responds to subliminal clues from the physical and social place of its 
enactment; it modifies to accommodate constraints, to flatter or 
anticipate critic, to create places for the audience, and thereby stages a 
satisfying collective experience. It creates its own reality and its own 
space of performance, closer to theatre than to the epic genre of writing. 
 It is clear that Certeau sees talking as the exemplary case of a 
practice. It unites all the elements he lists as definitional: the capacity for 
creating new- ness from within an established structure, which includes 
the element of chance creation; the responsiveness and indebtedness of 
this creation to the cultural and physical context; the performative force 
inherent in enunciations, which extends from the performer to the 
community and holds the power of speech to manipulate the reception of 
reality; its modulation of time and reliance on memory for lasting effects. 
Speaking as the practice par excellence accounts for the peculiar status of 
rhetoric: it is not a science, but a qualitative collection of linguistic moves 
(in memory) of what speaking does and how it does it. 
 
Efficacy of everyday practices 
Certeau sees these diverse practices as the spontaneous expression of a 
heterogeneous society and juxtaposes the universal rationality of the 
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system to the local efficacy of everyday practice. These practices must be 
evaluated then not in terms of conforming to rationality or living up to a 
grand ideal, but in terms of what they bring about (Jullien 1995). 
 The common man is an anti-hero: his goal is to get by by making 
do, not to fulfill an aesthetic or moral ideal, and certainly not to stand up 
to fate or state power and go down in a brilliant flash of destruction like 
the hero of Greek tragedy. He is opportunistic: he wants to respond as 
well as possible to the challenge that faces him and make it to the next 
one just down the road. He is satisficing, as Herbert Simon would say: he 
uses the minimal effort to get the desired effect (Simon 1956). 
 One cannot really speak of a goal in this pursuit, because there is 
no final state when the process might come to a halt and no resting place 
along the way. As someone said: Life is just one damn thing after another. 
Having done one thing one moves on to the next; each move opens up 
new situations and offers new occasions — and obstacles. 
 Certeau was inspired by the Chinese ideal of efficacy as the art of 
exploiting the conditions of the world to achieve maximal impact with 
minimal effort (Jullien 1995). He invokes the I Ching and Sun Tzu’s Art of 
War and later in the book he explicitly draws out the sequence of effects 
derived from a tendency to use less force and focus instead on 
accumulating memory, which in turn reduces the time preparing a 
response and creates maximal effect with minimal effort. The scheme is 
inscribed in a semblance of a Greimasian square (PEL p. 83): 
 (I) less FORCE —> (II) more Memory —> (III) less TIME —>(IV) 
 more  EFFECTS, and hence again (I) less Force. 
 The situation itself furnishes the material — physical, linguistic, 
imaginary — used in the response. By selecting and putting elements of 
the situation together into a specific, effective configuration, the ruse 
creates a new path or enforces an existing one and thus brings about a 
distinct future, which can be subsumed under a goal and a rational end 
only in retrospect. Ruses are arational, if rationality means planning steps 
in advance followed by an execution according to that plan. They take in 
the situation and respond with an intuitive leap, which only the outcome 
can justify, hence are, as Certeau says, “aleatoric a priori, and necessary 
only a posteriori “(PEL p. 153). 
 Ruses escape from the differentiation of project and means and 
ends. They are outside calculative goal-driven rationality. Certeau takes 
this as indication of a deep philosophical rift. Deleuze listed three ways 
whereby rationality finds itself limited: stupidity, madness, and malice 
(Deleuze 1984). With the ruse Certeau is adding a fourth, but one that 
operates on an outside within the system of rationality. 
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Limits to rationality. Limits to knowledge. 
Ruses share a common ancestry with storytelling and games. One of the 
first books on ruses is a collection of morality tales written at the end of 
14th century: The Book of Ruses (1995). Ruses are associated with 
deception, tricks, subterfuge, and in an old French reading, with the 
roundabout path game uses to escape the pursuit of the hunter, as defined 
in the Merriam-Webster dictionary. Obviously, ruses relate to conflictual 
situations and to the means employed to escape from them. 
 But it is a specific mode of escape, one that Certeau illuminates 
with the classical distinction of tactic and strategy. Tactical is the move 
that seizes the occasion and plays with the unattended, the unexpected. 
Tactic is without the ambition to defend a certain terrain, whether 
physical or conceptual. It operates always on someone else’s territory and 
neither can nor wants to hold on to what it creates. Practices and ruses 
are tactical in this sense. Strategy, in contradistinction, is the art that 
makes use of a proper place and is characterized by having a proper 
place. The proper place might be the stronghold from which one starts a 
military operation and to which one returns. In intellectual matters it 
might be the theoretical position one defends or the disciplinary 
boundary one protects. Strategic moves are predicated on territory and 
hence tend to be acquisitive in that respect. If the pursuit is of an 
intellectual nature, then the nature of the ruse is to escape from the grasp 
of the discipline. 
 Here is the dilemma that Certeau recognizes so clearly: If one 
wants to get a hold of practice, one either transforms/ translates it into 
inert matter — a move he demonstrates with Bourdieu’s writing 
strategies, or one must give up on the scientific project altogether and use 
a language that mirrors the features of the ruse and becomes 
performative in turn; this manner of use Certeau illustrates with the help 
of Detienne and Vernant’s work on the Greek concept of Metis. 
 Detienne and Vernant, in narrating the use of metis in Greek 
ancient times, revert to a language use that is itself tactical and full of 
ruses: there is no definition or description, no straightforward course of 
an argument. Instead, they approach obliquely, retell what others told on 
the subject and through rhetorical means — elisions, inversions, puns, 
word plays — invite the reader to enter into the narration, but they 
themselves cannot be tied down. 
 Certeau claims that the same procedures are at work in operating 
and in speaking: in both cases it is the art of harmonizing the operations 
and consequences with the participants and the occasion. The story does 
not express; it makes the practice. Narration does not describe reality; it 
creates a fictional space for a performance that takes in the narrator and 
the audience along with the fictitious characters of the story. There are 
highly successful attempts to produce the same experience in writing. 
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However, though they are common in poetry and literature, they are very 
rare in philosophy. And when they are used, they are often 
misunderstood as failures to describe or deliberate obscurity. (For an 
instance of such writing see Blanchot’s Writing of Disaster (1995) and its 
review by Sturrock 1982). 
 Language used in this way cannot be called upon to capture its 
own action. If language turns to describe itself in operation, the effect is 
gone — in the same way one might try to turn around to see one’s own 
backside in the mirror. This is one of the reasons that prompt Certeau to 
say that attempts to capture practices will always return one to question 
the manner and limits of language (PEL pp. 11). 
 Metis plays, first, on Kairos – i.e., the right point in time; second it 
uses disguises, physical and linguistic to dissolve proper place, and third, 
it disappears in its own doing: it has no mirror of itself. These three 
elements can be attributed to stories in general. This, he claims, also 
shows the nature of practices: they exist only in time, in the performance; 
like the stories of oral culture they leave no trace of their passing, claim 
no territory, occupy no place. 
 Metis is efficacious in virtue of a body of knowledge made up of 
the “unending summation of particular fragments” (PEL p. 82). This 
summation of many moments and heterogeneous elements is just another 
name for memory, which retains items in relation to the occasion of their 
use. “Metis in fact, counts on an accumulated time which is in its favor to 
overcome a hostile composition of place.” (PEL p.82) 
 In the Iliad Ulysses was given the epithet polimetis, i.e., possessing 
of many tricks. It is tempting to see the ruse as something one can have, 
like a skill that gets activated relative to specific events and reveals itself 
at specific points in time. But it would be misleading to make it appear as 
if the ruse pre- existed the moment of its performance and independent of 
the situation, when indeed it is impossible to make that separation, just as 
it is impossible to identify the ruse completely with the moment and the 
situation. There is something more at work, but it is difficult to grasp, 
precisely because it performs within the situation, it creates with minimal 
effort and disappears. 
 If ruses acquire something of the character of a knowledge that 
can be had, for instance, as a “bag of tricks,” it is because of memory. 
Memory lets them gather imprints of former use, by retaining stories of 
earlier occasions or proverbs that have a rule-like character. But they 
follow no proper rules or logic. If one can speak of a logic here at all, it is 
“a logic of the operations of action relative to types of situations” (PEL p. 
21; ital. mine). 
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Practice as knowledge 
The juxtaposition of theory and practice opened up already in the times of 
ancient Greece as a bifurcation in knowledge. Philosophers distinguished 
the knowledge acquired and secured by contemplation from the more 
dubious knowledge of the artist and artisan. While the first was of a 
theoretical kind, secured by a deliberate and repeatable (scientific) 
process, its truth guaranteed by a higher authority (Remember that the 
term theoria relates to the vision of transcendent eternal forms 
(Nightingale 2004) the knowledge of the artists and artisans was of a 
different and, philosophers said, inferior kind. 
 This kind of knowledge is only revealed in practice, even if it can 
be recognized as knowledge in the resultant works. Practitioners do not 
understand it themselves: they do not know what it consists in, cannot 
reason from it or reflect on it, and cannot pass it on other than by 
demonstration and imitation. 
 And yet, over the centuries philosophers have failed to adequately 
dispose of this form of knowledge by either accounting for it within their 
own model or reducing it to irrelevance. The irritation persists. The 
distinction is alive to this day in the separation of creation from 
production, which Certeau illustrates by citing the response of Fiat 
leadership to the workers’ attempts to discuss their own change ideas 
with them. The workers’ input was cordially rejected: creation is after all 
the domain of management, workers merely produce (CP p. 142). 
 “One can acquire it only by doing,” says Diderot about this know-
how along with many others before and after him. The manifold practices 
of apprenticeship, formal and informal, bear him out. The immediacy and 
unreflected nature of operations, more than that: the absence of a theory, 
of a dis course that explains how the product comes about, renders 
artistic practice “improper” in the eyes of the philosopher or scientist. 
(The term proper relates not just to a moral judgment, but also related to 
property and appropriate, hence to a place that is fitting and deemed 
rightfully one’s own). 
 Originally many of everyday practices were considered artistic 
creations. But since they cannot claim a proper theoretical place, they are 
perfect candidates for ex-propriation in a society that recognizes only the 
scientific form of knowledge and its disciplinary realm. What is outside 
that space needs to be brought into the proper discourse of science. But 
how should this be done? 
 Certeau makes the inspired claim that the gap was to be filled 
through the invention of a new middle ground between art and science/ 
practice and theory: the discipline of engineering. While it did not succeed 
in spanning the gap, its practical accomplishments gradually replaced 
many of artful practices of earlier times with technology and thereby 
removed more and more of these everyday practices and with it the gap 
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itself from public view. The so- displaced practices turn up in the setting 
of novels and stand in the background of questions of taste and style. 
 Kant is the notable exception to this general blindness. In his 
Critique of Practical Reason (Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft 1788) he 
talks about good judgment, which needs to intervene when theory is 
applied to practice, because one must decide whether a theoretical rule or 
principle should be applied and that decision cannot be part of theory else 
it leads to an infinite regress. Good judgment is an intuition that is formed 
by considering the situation in all its manifold aspects and possibilities, 
and combines all considerations in a quality he calls “logical tact” (Kant in 
Eisner 1971). Logical tact tells one what clothes to wear for what 
occasion; what ornament is right for a building, and so on. The faculty of 
judgment comes up with the right result without knowing or 
understanding how the decision is made. It is a real art that can be 
observed in practice, says Kant, like the balancing act of a tightrope 
walker, unlike the skill of a stage magician, which is dismissed as art once 
one has understood how it is worked (Kant 1788, § 43). Such skill cannot 
ever become theory, but it can inform the making of theory. It can ground 
knowledge, says Certeau, and “shape the opaque reality out of which a 
theoretical question can arise beyond the frontiers of any discipline” (PEL 
p. 51). 
 
How to capture Everyday practices (Tricks and ruses of scientific 
writing practices) 
Having gone this far in claiming the essential difference of practice, one 
may ask how Certeau envisions their relation to the discourses that 
purport to deal with them in a scientific manner. He asserts that they can 
only be brought into discourse by being transformed. However, he adds 
that a discourse can legitimate itself and “maintain[s] the mark of 
scientificity by explicating the conditions and rules of its own production 
and the relations that gave rise to it” (PEL. P. 72). This, I take it, he offers 
as a redemptive move on behalf of the theoretical disciplines. 
 Foucault’s notion of discourse informs Certeau’s use of the term. 
He sees it as a historically and institutionally conditioned universe of 
signs, symbols and objects, which manifests itself in the enunciations of 
its members and in turn constraints what meaning and knowledge they 
can express. Knowledge must be seen to exist only in reference to such a 
discourse, never in isolation, and never given as independent fact. 
 In order to show the process of transformation of a practice into a 
theoretical discourse Certeau analyzes the specific writing practices that 
Bourdieu uses in his Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977) and the Logic 
of Practice (1980). Certeau presents these as prime examples of the 
techniques and stylistic devices that researchers in general may use to 
bring practice into discourse. 
Journal of Business Anthropology, 10(1), Spring 2021 
 
 218 
 One basic trick employed by Bourdieu could be called Ysteron 
Proteron (Damiris & Wild 1997) which can be rendered in English as 
“taking the second to be first:” Bourdieu places the theoretical notions he 
derived from his studies on Kabylian and Bearnian societies, i.e. the 
habitus and society as a space of transformational rules, in the foreground 
as if they had come first, while gradually erasing their origin in 
ethnographic observations and dispersing references to the ethnographic 
material throughout the text to claim them as effects and confirmations 
for the theory. 
 Next Certeau sees Bourdieu and other researchers apply a simple 
recipe, namely to “cut out and turn over” (PEL p. 62). Cut out: that is, from 
an undifferentiated and bewildering cultural field the researcher cuts out 
a piece and names it a specific practice (say, of healing, initiation, 
marriage, etc.); then the cut out is turned over and used to identify and 
illuminate a state of affairs in one’s own society. 
 Another device for bringing practices into discourse is the use of 
tables, charts or other type of synoptic representation, which replaces the 
dynamics of practices with spatial arrangements of nodes and links. 
Certeau invokes the earlier comments on strategy as the art of a place 
that drives out the temporal aspect and “with which the scientific method 
conceals the operation of withdrawal and power that makes them 
possible” (PEL p.53). Certeau calls this spatial rendering a first deception, 
because the nodes and links in these tables do not hold a stable meaning: 
what they mean depends on and changes with their activation within a 
concrete situation. And there is always the possibility that an earlier 
meaning is undone by a future development (for instance, if no legitimate 
child is born in a marriage). A second deception comes from the 
practitioners themselves, who silently tolerate the claim that their 
practice has been captured in such a table (- possibly a ruse to escape 
appropriation?). “[K]nowledge of practices,” says Certeau, “is thus the 
result of a twofold deception” (PEL p.53). 
 Once a practice has been inserted into such a structure of nodes 
and links, this can be dynamicized and made to operate along quasi-
mechanical transformational rules. In the Logic of Practice Bourdieu 
identifies the set of meta-rules that operate upon the first-level structure 
at the level of differences and variations. These meta-rules indicate then 
how practices change and transform their meaning due to circumstance, 
the turning and returning of the situations. With that the different 
practices appear contained as variations within one total economic 
system: they appear to function completely within the system’s 
rationality of accumulation and recreation of order or symbolic capital. 
 One needs to step back to see that such meta-rules do nothing to 
identify practices; they are only comprehensible if one accepts as an 
article of faith that the whole field of these practices serve the larger 
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purposes of the society – i.e. if one accepts that they are really strategies 
of the symbolic order to make the individual pursue goals society deems 
useful, such as procreation,  marriage, succession, education and so on. 
 The closure Bourdieu achieves relies on the notion of the habitus, 
which functions like a generative grammar, except that it does not rely on 
a universal mind. He defines habitus as a system of “durable transposable 
dispositions, structured structures […], predisposed to function as 
principles which generate and organize practices and representations 
that can be adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious 
aiming at ends or a mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain 
them.” (Bourdieu 1993 p.5) With this he moves into the realm of 
impersonal strategies culled from the invisible habitus that produce the 
observed individual behaviors. Improvisation on that view must be a 
fiction produced by the projection of the habitus into the stable forms of 
the physical world while all along a subterranean logic causes agents to 
strive for the requisite capital: reputation or power or wealth. 
 Certeau claims that this logic camouflages that what Bourdieu 
calls “practices” are really transgressions in the existing symbolic order, 
and appear legitimate only because they work within the determinations 
and ordinary uses of language, while surreptitiously undermining them. 
 
Undoable, hence unthinkable 
Certeau finishes the book with reflections on the changing function of 
writing in establishing what is real. If earlier analyses accused writing of 
subduing the body to function as a mobile, fleeting page – with Foucault’s 
Discipline and Punish and Kafka’s Penal Colony as favorite reference 
points, writing today, Certeau claims, is after a scientific vision of the 
future. It seeks to make the body into the forum on which science plays 
out its struggle against time: by battling aging, promising continuous 
progress on all technological fronts, and in general, bringing everything 
under the reign of the will-to-do (p. 196). 
 Society supports the vision with a general prohibition to speak of 
conditions that fall outside what science can do or any critique of the 
vision itself. “Nothing can be said in a place where nothing more can be 
done” (p. 190), says Certeau. As a result certain aspects of life disappear 
from view, notably death and all kind of disease or disaster that science 
and technology are helpless to control. One can no longer speak about 
death or technological violence; they substitute for the repressed figures 
in the times of Freud, sexuality and aggression. 
 However, “[…] the death that cannot be said, can be written [..]” 
(PEL p. 195) so that retroactively the limits can be recaptured in writing. 
Only the limit that is found thereby always lies in the past, moved at a 
distance and made approachable and tame — like the everyday practices 
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of old — in a literary form. “Only the end of an age makes it possible to 
say what made it live, as if it had to die in order to become a book” (p. 
198). Others have remarked on this relation between writing and death in 
the practice of science. At least in the West it is built on a drive to conquer 
through writing and to understand by taking apart: whether in anatomy 
or history, representation, depiction and still life (nature morte) take over 
after life is extinct. 
 But the repressed returns; despite all efforts of science the body- 
support wears out and death appears again at the limits of what can be 
said. This appears more as a triumph of the human condition over a 
totalizing system than a defeat. One might expand this note of hope and 
invoke the ruses of everyday life as a corrective counterpoint to the death 
drive of writing: if ruses can create new beginnings from within a 
structurally determined universe, then one should be able to use them to 
revitalize and reverse an exhausted or misdirected system of rationality. 
In the days of old, before innovation acquired its quasi-theological aura, 
new ideas were always inserted into the mouth of a well-established, 
ideally dead, authority and by the time the true origin was discovered, the 
innovation had become accepted as commonplace. One might learn from 
such tricks the ways of introducing corrective change under the guise of 
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